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CASENOTES
Economic Loss in Products Liability: Strict Liability or the Uniform Commercial
Code? Spring Motors Distributors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co.' — Within the last twenty years
there has been great controversy as to what remedy is appropriate in actions concerning
economic loss2 caused by a defective product. The debate has focused on whether a
buyer of defective goods should be restricted to a cause of action under the Uniform
Commercial Code (U.C.C. or Coder or should be allowed to pursue a cause of action
predicated on strict liability.' Two lines of reasoning have emerged. The majority of
98 N.J. 555, 489 A.2d 660 (1985).
2 Purely economic loss falls into two categories: direct economic loss and indirect or conse-
quential economic loss. Comment, The Vexing Problem of the Purely Economic Loss in Products Liability:
An Injury In Search of a Remedy, 4 SETON HALL L. Rev. 145, 155 (1972) [hereinafter Comment, The
Vexing Problem]. Direct economic loss includes loss of the bargain, measured by the difference
between the value of the product as represented and the value of the product in its defective
condition, repair costs, and direct incidental expenditures incurred in replacing a defective product
which cannot be repaired. Id. In contrast, indirect or consequential economic loss includes com-
mercial losses such as loss of future business profits and opportunities and any indirect loss resulting
from an inability to replace a defective product. Id.
The provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code relevant to products liability are	 2-313,
2-314, and 2-315. Under these provisions, a cause of action arises when a seller expressly or impliedly
warrants that a product shall conform to a certain standard of quality and the product fails to meet
this standard. These warranty provisions pose a series of hurdles, however, that a buyer must
overcome before recovering for a breach of warranty. For instance, under 2-314, the seller must
be a "merchant with respect to goods of that kind" and not merely a seller. Under § 2-315, a
warranty for a particular purpose arises only if the buyer relies upon the seller's skill or judgment
in making his or her purchase. In addition, a buyer also must confront the obstacles to recovery of
the privity and notice requirements, imposed by § 2-318 and § 2-607, and the availability to the
seller of disclaimers and a limitation of damages, under 1 2-316 and § 2-719. For discussion of
products liability and the U.C.C., see Wade, Tort Liability for Products Cawing Physical Injury and
Article 2 of the U.C.C., 48 Mo. L. REV. 1 (1983); Speidel, Products Liability, Economic Loss and the
U.C.C., 40 TENN. L. Rev. 309 (1973); Rapson, Products Liability Under Parallel Doctrines: Contrasts
Between the Uniform Commercial Code and Strict Liability in Tort, 19 RurceRs L. REV. 692 (1965).
In light of the obstacles to recovery which warranty law imposes, the drafters of the Second
Restatement of Torts provided § 402A, Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to
User or Consumer, which extended the theory of strict liability, already in use with regard to
animals and abnormally dangerous activities, to manufacturers of defective products. See W. Nos-
sea, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW or 'TORTS 956-57 (4th ed. 1971).
§ 402A provides:
(I) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the
user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby
caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 402A (1965). While § 402A imposes its own obstacles to recovery,
requiring a defective condition unreasonably dangerous, a seller who is in the business of selling
the product, and a defective condition that existed when it left the manufacturer, it does away with
383
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jurisdictions deny recovery in strict liability for purely economic harm, 5 reasoning that
the doctrine of strict liability grew out of a need to compensate consumers for personal
injury, a need often frustrated by the Uniform Commercial Code. 6 Because the Code
appropriately provides a remedy for economic loss, however, the majority contends the
doctrine of strict liability is therefore inapplicable.? Therefore, the majority employs a
type-of-harm approach in considering the availability of the doctrine and denies recovery
in strict liability for solely economic harm. 9
 On the other hand, a minority of jurisdictions
allow recovery in strict liability for economic harm, 9
 reasoning that the purpose of strict
liability is to shift the risk of loss to the makers of defective products, rather than to
injured consumers who are powerless to protect themselves.tU The minority thus looks
to the relationship between the manufacturer and the consumer," or a type-of-consumer
approach, to permit recovery for economic loss under the doctrine of strict liability.
In the 1985 case of Spring Motors Distributors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 12 the New Jersey
Supreme Court, the originator of the minority approach, considered whether the policy
reasons for allowing recovery for economic loss in strict liability are as pressing when
the plaintiff suffering the loss is not a powerless, ordinary consumer, but rather, a
commercial purchaser." The court held that the commercial consumer could not recover
and instead must seek damages for economic loss under the U.C.C." The plaintiff,
Spring Motors Distributors, Inc. (Spring Motors), was in the business of selling and
leasing a fleet of 300 trucks. Spring Motors entered into an agreement to purchase from
the defendant, Turnpike Ford Truck Sales, Inc. (Turnpike), fourteen trucks made by
the defendant, Ford Motor Co. (Ford)." In the agreement, Spring Motors specified that
Ford should equip the trucks with transmissions made by Clark Equipment Company
the contractual defenses of notice and disclaimer that pose such problems for consumers seeking
to recover for breach of warranty. See W. PROSSER, supra, at 658.
3 See infra note 99 for a partial list of jurisdictions denying recovery in strict liability for purely
economic harm.
9 See, e.g., Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 15, 403 P.2d 145, 149, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 21
(1965).
7 See id. at 16, 403 P.2d at 150, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 22.
8 See, e.g., id. at 15-19, 403 P.2d at 149-52, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 21-24.
'	 9 See, Santor v. A. & M. Karagheusian, 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965); Cova v. Harley
Davidson Motor Co., 26 Mich. App. 602, 182 N.W.2d 800 (1970); LaCrosse v. Schubert, Schroeder
& Assoc., 72 Wis. 2d 38, 240 N.W.2d 124 (1976); Iacono v. Anderson Concrete Corp., 42 Ohio St.
2d 88, 326 N.E.2d 267 (1975); Mead Corp. v. Allendale Mutual Ins. Co., 465 F. Supp. 355 (N.D.
Ohio 1979).
1 ° See, e.g., Santor, 44 N.J. at 65, 207 A.2d at 312.
LI For purposes of this casenote, a consumer is either an "ordinary consumer" or a "commercial
consumer." Neither the U.C.C. nor case law has clearly defined these terms. See U.C.C. 2-719
(1978) (unconscionability regarding limitation of damages in case of consumer goods and case of
commercial loss, neither "consumer" nor "commercial loss" defined); Franklin, When Worlds Collide:
Liability Theories and Disclaimers in Defective-Product Cases, 18 STAN. L. REV. 974, 994 (1966). One
commentator has noted that Justice Peters' concurring and dissenting opinion in Seely, 63 Cal. 2d
9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965), leaves courts no alternative in drawing the line between
commercial and non-commercial consumers other than to examine the bargaining power of the
plaintiff in each case. Note, Manufacturers' Liability To Remote Purchasers For "Economic Lou" Damages
— Tort or Contract?, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 539, 549 n.55 (1966).
17 98 N.J. 555, 489 A.2d 660 (1985).
13 Id. at 575, 489 A.2d at 670.
ti Id. at 578, 489 A.2d at 672.
Id. at 562, 489 A.2d at 663. Turnpike is a Ford dealer. Throughout the proceeding, the two
defendants were treated as a single entity. Id.
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(Clark), a supplier to Ford. At the time of the sale to Spring Motors, Ford issued a
warranty with each truck to repair or replace specific parts. The warranty disclaimed
any other warranties and restricted recovery to repair or replacement of parts."' The
warranty that Clark extended to Ford similarly disclaimed all other warranties and, at
Clark's option, limited recovery to repairs or replacement. 17
Spring Motors took delivery of the trucks in November, 1976. 18 Spring Motors then
leased the trucks to Economic Laboratories, Inc., which used the trucks for their intended
purpose of hauling. During the period of the lease, Spring Motors serviced the trucks.
As early as February, 1977, Spring Motors began experiencing problems with the per-
formance of the Clark transmissions. Correspondence between Spring Motors and Clark,
dated January, 1978, confirmed that Clark had analyzed the transmissions and found
that the failure was a result of improper angle degree in the way the gears were cut.
Clark provided Spring Motors with replacement parts, but the transmission failures
continued. 18 On July 11, 1978, Spring Motors wrote to Clark that in the absence of a
satisfactory response, it would remove and replace the Clark transmissions and take
action to hold Clark financially responsible. 2 °
Spring Motors brought an action in the New Jersey Superior Court, Law Division,
against Ford, Turnpike, and Clark, alleging that the defendants had breached implied
and express warranties. The plaintiff also alleged that the defendants were strictly liable
in tort. Spring Motors sought to recover the expenses of towing, repairs, replacement
of parts, the decrease in the market value of the trucks, and lost profits." Perceiving the
matter as sounding in contract, the trial court found that a lack of privity barred the
action between Spring Motors and Clark and that the four-year period of limitations
under the U.C.C." barred any warranty action against Ford and Turnpike." The court
granted summary judgment for the defendants."
The Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal of the breach of warranty claim, but
reversed the dismissal of the tort claims." Concluding that the action was characterized
as one in strict liability in tort, not contract, the Appellate Division held that Spring
la Id. The warranty stated: "To the extent allowed by law, this WARRANTY IS IN PLACE OF
all other warranties, express or implied, including ANY IMPLIED WARRANTY OF MERCHANT-
ABILITY OR FITNESS ....Under this warranty, repair or replacement of parts is the only
remedy, and loss of use of the vehicle, loss of time, inconvenience, commercial loss or consequential
damages are not covered." Id. (emphasis in original).
Id. at 562-63, 489 A.2d at 664. Clark's warranty provided in pertinent part:
Warranty. Clark Equipment Company ("Clark") warrants to Buyer that each new Clark
transmission ... and components thereof, shall be free from defects in material
and workmanship under normal use and maintenance ... THIS WARRANTY IS IN
LIEU OF ALL OTHER WARRANTIES (EXCEPT OF TITLE), EXPRESSED OR
IMPLIED, AND THERE IS NO IMPLIED WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY
OR OF FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. IN NO EVENT SHALL CLARK
BE LIABLE FOR INCIDENTAL, CONSEQUENTIAL OR SPECIAL DAMAGES.
Id. (emphasis in original).
"Id, at 563, 489 A.2d at 664.
la Id.
20 1d, at 563-64, 489 A.2d at 664.
2 ' Id. at 564, 489 A.2d at 664,
22 U.C.C. 2-725(1) (1978) provides in pertinent part: "An action for breach of any contract
for sale must be commenced within four years after the cause of action has accrued ...."
21 Spring Motors, 98 N.J. at 564, 489 A.2d at 664.
24 Id, at 561, 489 A.2d at 663.
25 Id. at 564, 489 A.2d at 663.
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Motors could maintain its strict liability claim against all defendants and that the action
was timely under the six-year limitation applicable to tort actions under state law." The
Supreme Court of New Jersey granted the defendants' petition for certification to review
that part of the Appellate Division judgment reversing the dismissal of the tort claims."
On review, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that a commercial consumer seeking
damages for economic loss resulting from the purchase of defective goods may not
recover from an immediate seller and a remote supplier in a distributive chain in strict
liability or negligence." A commercial consumer, the court ruled, must seek damages
for economic loss in an action for breach of warranty under the U.C.C. 29 The court
distinguished prior, case law by explaining that the policy reasons for allowing recovery
for strict liability are not as pressing in a case brought by a commercial consumer as they
are in a case brought by an ordinary consumer." The court further ruled that a buyer
need not establish privity with the remote supplier to maintain an action for breach of
express or implied warranties.'' The court stated that because the Code provides the
proper remedy, the appropriate limitation period is the four years allowed under the
Code." Because the four year period had run, the court held the action time barred."
The New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in Spring Motors is significant for four
reasons. First, the court uses a type-of-consumer test as the standard for allowing recov-
ery for economic loss in strict liability." Second, the decision clarifies that Santor v. A. &
M. Karaglicusian," a 1965 New Jersey Supreme Court decision, originated and advocated
this test." Third, the case unifies the minority of jurisdictions that follow Santor in
allowing recovery for economic loss in strict liability by application of the type-of-
consumer test." Finally, Spring Motors reduces the conflict between the majority of
jurisdictions, which deny recovery for economic loss in strict liability, and the minority
26 Id. at 564, 489 A.2d at 664-65 (citing Spring Motors Distrib. v. Ford Motor Co., 191 N.J.
Super. 22, 465 A.2d 530 (1983)). See NJ. STAT. ANN. 2A:14-1, which provides:
Every action at law for trespass to real property, for any tortious injury to real or
personal property, for taking, detaining, or converting personal property, for replevin
of goods or chattels, for any tortious injury to the rights of another not stated in
sections 2A:14-2 and 2A:14-3 of this Title, or for recovery upon a contractual claim
or liability, express or implied, not under seal, or upon an account other than one
which concerns the trade or merchandise between merchant and merchant, their
factors, agents and servants, shall be commenced within 6 years next after the cause
of any such action shall have accrued.
This section shall not apply to any action for breach of any contract for sale governed
by section I 2A:2-725 of the New Jersey Statutes.
27
 Spring Motors, 98 N.J. at 564, 489 A.2d at 665.
25 Id. at 578, 489 A.2d at 672.
" Id.
" Id, at 576-78, 489 A.2d at 670-72.
31 a at 582, 489 A.2d at 674.
32 Id.
33 Id.
54 See infra notes 267-81 and accompanying text for discussion of the Spring Motors court's use
of the type-of-consumer test.
'5 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965).
36 See Spring Motors, 98 N.J. at 568, 489 A.2d at 666-67. See also infra notes 282-84 and
accompanying text for discussion of Salaries use of the type-of-consumer test.
57 See infra notes 285-300 and accompanying text for discussion on the unification of the
jurisdictions following Santor.
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of jurisdictions, which allow such recovery. After Spring Motors, the majority and minority
views disagree only regarding recovery by ordinary consumers; the majority and minority
now agree that a commercial consumer cannot recover for economic loss in strict lia-
bility."
This casenote will begin by discussing the conflicting theories concerning economic
loss recovery in strict liability. Section I then will examine the current status of the
minority of jurisdictions allowing recovery in strict liability. Next, Section 1 will review
current New Jersey case law. Section II will discuss the New Jersey Supreme Court's
holding in Spring Motors. In Section III, this casenote will conclude that the court reached
the proper result and correctly used the type-of-consumer test as the standard for
determining when a consumer will be allowed to recover for economic loss in strict
liability. Finally, the casenote will scrutinize and apply this test to the decisions of the
minority of jurisdictions allowing strict liability recovery for economic loss to show that
Spring Motors unifies the minority result.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF THE TYPE-OF-HARNIrFYPE-OF-CONSUMER TESTS
A. The Beginnings of Strict Liability
The doctrine of strict liability is often referred to as a hybrid between tort and
contract law." The doctrine could just as well be referred to as a hybrid between New
Jersey and California case law. In the 1960 decision, Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors,
Inc.," the Supreme Court of New Jersey allowed a consumer who suffered personal
injury as a result of a defective automobile to recover from an automobile dealer and
the manufacturer under a theory of implied warranty, even in the absence of privity
between the consumer and the manufacturer." The Henningsen court noted that the
transcendent value of such warranties rests in the fact that strict liability is imposed upon
the manufacturer and recovery of damages does not depend upon proof of negligence. 42
Following the New Jersey court's lead and drawing on the Henningsen opinion, the
California Supreme Court adopted strict liability in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products.°
In Greenman, the plaintiff sued the manufacturer and retailer of a combination power
tool for personal injury suffered when a piece of wood flew out of the machine because
of the tool's defective design. 44 The machine manufacturer contended that the plaintiff's
breach of warranty action was barred because the plaintiff did not give sufficient notice
of the breach as required by section 1769 of the Civil Code:" The court's opinion,
however, written by Justice Traynor, rejected the manufacturer's argument, holding that
the notice requirement is not appropriate in actions by injured consumers against man-
" See Seely, 63 Cal. 2d at 15-19, 403 P.2d at 149-52, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 21-24; Spring Motors, 98
N.J. at 578, 489 A.2d at 672.
39 W. PROSSER, supra note 4, at 634,
40 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
41 Id. at 384, 161 A.2d at 84.
42 Id. at 372, 161 A.2d at 77.
43 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
44 Id. at 59-60, 377 P.2d at 898-99, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 698-99.
43 Id. at 60, 377 P.2d at 899, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 699. Section 1769 provided in part: "If, after
acceptance of the goods, the buyer fails to give notice to the seller of the breach of any promise or
warranty within a reasonable time after the buyer knows, or ought to know of such breach, the
seller shall not be liable therefor." Uniform Sales Act, Civil Code, §§ 1721-1800.
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ufacturers with whom they have not dealt," reasoning that "the injured consumer is
seldom 'steeped in the business practice which justifies the rule.'" 47 The court added that
the liability imposed is one governed not by the law of contracts, but by the law of strict
liability in tort." Moreover, the court stated that the purpose of such liability is to insure
that the cost of injuries resulting from defective products are borne by the manufacturers
that put such products in the stream of commerce rather than by the injured persons
who are powerless to protect themselves." In conclusion, the court pointed out that sales
warranties alone serve this purpose fitfully at best."
B. Santor and Seely
Up to this point, the case law of the two jurisdictions concurred that the doctrine
of strict liability should be available to plaintiffs who had suffered physical injury" as a
result of a defective product. In the 1965 decisions, Santor v. A. & M. Karagheusian" and
Seely v. White Motor Co.," however, New Jersey and California case law split over the
troublesome question of whether economic loss should be recoverable in strict liability.
In Santor v. A. & M. Karagheusian," the leading case allowing recovery for economic
loss in strict liability, the plaintiff purchased carpeting for his home from a retailer of
the defendant-manufacturer, Karagheusian.55 Almost immediately, the carpeting devel-
oped a number of lines. Although the retailer assured the plaintiff that the lines would
walk out, they grew worse. 56 Because the retailer had gone out of business and moved
out of state, Santor sued the manufacturer for a breach of an implied warranty of
merchantability to recover the purchase price of the carpet." Conceding that it had
manufactured the carpet defectively, Karagheusian nevertheless contended that the
plaintiff was not in privity to the contract between the manufacturer and the retailer
and therefore could not recover for a breach of that contract." The defendant main-
tained that courts had abrogated the privity rule only in cases where the consumer
suffered personal injury as a result of the defective product,59 and that where the
defective product results only in a reduction of value of the product, the privity rule
endures."
46 Greenman, 59 Cal. 2d at 61, 377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700.
47 Id. (quoting James, Products Liability, 34 TEXAS L. REV. 44, 192, 197 (1955)).
48 Id. at 63, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
49 Id.
" Id. at 63-64, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
51 "Physical injury" includes both personal injury and property damage. See Note, Economic Loss
in Products Liability Jurisprudence, 66 CoLum. L. REV. 917 (1966) [hereinafter Note, Economic Lass].
Because of the doctrine's origins in defective food cases, the resulting injury of which was always
personal injury, such injury dominated early strict liability cases. W. PROSSER, supra note 4, at 666.
As the doctrine extended beyond food and drink to products likely to cause property damage,
physical harm to property became recoverable under strict liability. Id.
"44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965).
" 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965).
54
 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965).
55 Id. at 56, 207 A.2d at 307.
" Id.
" Id. at 56-57, 207 A.2d at 307.
"Id. at 57, 207 A.2d at 307.
" See Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960) (eliminating
requirement of privity when consumer suffers persona] injury as a result of defective product).
6° Santor, 44 N.J. at 57-58, 207 A.2d at 307-08.
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The New Jersey Supreme Court rejected the defendant's privity argument and held
unanimously for the plaintiff.61 The Santor court explained that although the great mass
of warranty cases allowing recovery regardless of privity were personal injury cases, the
field of operation of implied warranty "should not be fenced in by such a factor." 62
Rather, the court stated, it could see no reason for recognition of a right to recovery in
the case of personal injury and the exclusion of recovery when inadequate manufacturing
produces a worthless article. In both instances, the court reasoned, "the manufacturer
is the father of the transaction."" Accordingly, the court concluded that the plaintiff, as
the ultimate purchaser of the defective product, could maintain his action directly against
the defendant-manufacturer for loss of the value of the carpeting."
Although the holding was grounded in implied warranty, the Santor court went on
to conclude that the manufacturer's liability could be cast in the simpler form of strict
liability." In the court's view, because the majority of the purchasing public lacks ade-
quate knowledge and sufficient opportunity to determine if a product is defective, it
must rely on the maker's skill." Therefore, the court held, when a manufacturer presents
its goods to the public, there is a representation implicit in the goods' presence on the
market that they are suitable and safe for intended use.° Defining the obligation of the
manufacturer as "what in justice it ought to be — an enterprise liability, and one which
should not depend upon the intricacies of the law of sales," 66 the court stated that the
purpose of such liability is to insure that the cost of injuries or damages resulting from
defective products is borne by the makers of the products who put them in the channels
of trade, rather than by the injured persons who ordinarily are powerless to protect
themselves.69 Therefore, the Santor court reasoned, if the manufacturer breaches its duty
to avoid producing products that are "defective, that is, not reasonably fit for the ordinary
purposes for which such articles are sold and used," 70 it must be responsible for the
consequent damage or injury. 71 Furthermore, the court continued, although courts have
applied the responsibility principally in connection with personal injury, it should be no
°' Id. at 69, 207 A.2d at 314.
67 Id. at 59-60, 207 A.2d at 308-09.
65 Id. at 59, 207 A.2d at 309.
04 Id. at 63, 207 A.2d at 310.
65 Id. at 63-64, 207 A.2d at 311.
" Id. at 64, 207 A.2d at 311 (citing Henningsen, 32 N.J. at 384, 161 A.2d at 83).
67 Id. at 64-65, 207 A.2d at 311 (citing Greenman, 59 Cal. 2d at 64, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal.
Rptr. at 701).
58 Id. at 65, 207 A.2d at 311-12. The Samar decision involved facts that occurred before the
adoption of the U.C.C. in New Jersey. See Spring Motors, 98 N.J. at 568, 489 A.2d at 666. The New
Jersey legislature adopted the U.C.C. in 1961, effective January 1, 1963. Sarum., 44 N.J. at 65, 207
A.2d at 311-12.
Santor, 44 N.J. at 65, 207 A.2d at 312.
70 1d. at 67, 207 A.2d at 313. This definition of "defective" is in keeping with the definition of
"merchantable" under U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(c) (1978) which states: "Goods to be merchantable must
be at least such as are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used." Santor, 44 N.J.
at 67, 207 A.2d at 313. The Santor court refused to define the outer limits of the term "defect,"
but stated that the concept is a broad one. Additionally, "defectiveness" causing economic loss may
be dependent upon "the price at which the manufacturer reasonably contemplated that the article
might be sold," Id. This foundation for defectiveness implies that a product departing from average
quality might not be defective if the price at which it is sold reflects its quality. See Comment, The
Vexing Problem, supra note 2, at 157; Note, Economic Loss, supra note 51, at 938.
71 44 N.J. at 67, 207 A.2d at 313.
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different where damage to the article sold or to other property of the consumer is
involved."
While Santor saw no reason to make a distinction between recovery for personal
injury and economic loss, the Supreme Court of California made just that distinction in
refusing to extend the doctrine of strict liability to permit recovery for a purely economic
loss in Seely v. White Motor Co." Decided shortly after Santor, the Seely decision involved
a conditional sales contract between the plaintiff and a dealer for the purchase of a truck
manufactured by the defendant, White Motor Co., for use in the plaintiff's business of
heavy-duty hauling:74 The defendant expressly warranted the truck to be "free from
defects in material and workmanship under normal use and service ...." 75 Upon taking
possession of the truck, the plaintiff found that it bounced violently." He then sued the
defendant-manufacturer for repair of the truck, loss of the benefit of the bargain, and
profits lost in his business because he was unable to make normal use of the truck. 77 The
trial court awarded damages for the plaintiff for payments on the purchase price and
for lost profits."
The California Supreme Court held that the award was proper on the basis of a
breach of express warranty." More importantly, the court stated in dictum that the
defendant was not strictly liable in tort.°° The Seely court reasoned that the doctrine of
strict liability developed in response to the distinct problem of personal injury and a
recognition that the warranty doctrine of the U.C.C. was an incomplete solution to the
problem." The court stated that although warranty theory is not suited to the field of
liability for personal injury, it functions well in a commercial setting such as that between
the plaintiff and dealer." Moreover, the court noted that to hold the defendant strictly
liable for the commercial loss suffered by the consumer would be to open the defendant
to liability for business losses of other truckers caused by the failure of its trucks to meet
the specific needs of their businesses and to damages of unknown and unlimited scope."
Explaining the rationale for applying strict liability in cases of physical injury, but
not economic loss, the Seely court stated that the distinction is not arbitrary and does not
rest on the "luck" of one plaintiff in having an accident causing physical injury. Rather,
the court explained, the distinction rests on the nature of the responsibility of the
manufacturer.°4 The court concluded that while a manufacturer can be held liable for
physical injuries caused by defects by requiring its goods to match a standard of safety,
it cannot be held liable for the level of performance of its products in the consumer's
business unless it agrees that the product will meet the consumer's demands.'" Moreover,
72 Id. at 66, 207 A.2d at 312.
" 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965).
Id. at 12, 403 P.2d at 147, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 19.
75 Id. at 13, 403 P.2d at 148, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 20.
76 Id. at 12, 403 P.2d at 147; 45 Cal. Rptr. at 19.
" Id. at 12-13, 403 P.2d at 147-48, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 19-20.
'9 Id. at 13, 403 P.2d at 148, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 20.
75 Id.
9° Id. at 15-19, 403 P.2d at 149-52, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 21-24.
51 Id. at 15, 403 P.2d at 149, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 21.
5'2
	 at 16, 403 P.2d at 150, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 22.
" Id. at 17, 403 P.2d at 150-51, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 22-23.
" Id. at 18, 403 P.2d at 151, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 23.
' 5 Id.
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the court stated, the rationale in applying strict liability does not rest on an analysis of
the bargaining power of the parties to a particular action, but rather, on the manufac-
turer's ability to insure against the risk of injury and to distribute the cost of insurance
among the public as a cost of doing business. 86 The Seely court concluded that there is
no justification for requiring the consenting; public to pay more for their products so
that a manufacturer can insure against the pOssibility that its products will not meet the
business needs of its customers."
While the Seely majority opinion rejected Santor, Justice Peters' concurring and
dissenting opinion embraced it. Justice Peters concurred only in the affirmance of the
judgment. 88 Justice Peters' dissent distinguished a type-of-consumer approach from a
type-of-harm approach to considering the availability of the strict liability doctrine. He
noted that the nature of the damage is immaterial; rather, the relative roles played by
the parties to the contract and the nature of their transaction warrants analysis." Because,
as the majority recognized, the rules governing warranty were developed to meet the
needs of commercial transactions, Justice Peters reasoned that it is necessary to look to
the transaction to determine whether the transaction was commercial, rather than a sale
to an ordinary consumer at the end of the marketing chain. Justice Peters questioned
how the nature of the damages which occur later, long after the transaction has been
completed, can control the characterization of the transaction and concluded that the
line determining the appropriate remedy should be drawn at the time of sale."
Justice Peters reasoned that the rationale for the development of strict liability was
to protect people who, because of their unequal bargaining power, were unable to protect
themselves. 9 ' Therefore, the dissent continued, when the plaintiff is an ordinary con-
sumer, the doctrine of strict liability should control his or her right to recover. 92 Con-
versely, Justice Peters stated that the warranty sections of the U.C.C. should apply within
the world of commerce where parties generally bargain on an equal plane and are
familiar with the requirements imposed by warranty law. 98
Addressing the fears expressed by the majority in Seely, Justice Peters concluded
that a manufacturer's liability would not be of an unknown and unlimited scope if the
term "defective" in strict liability is viewed as coextensive with the concept of "unmer-
chantable" in the implied warranty field. 94 Under this view, a manufacturer only would
be liable for economic loss resulting from defects which would frustrate the consumer's
se /d. at 18-19, 403 P.2d at 151, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 23 (citing Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24
Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 441 (1944) (Trayrior, J., concurring)).
" Id. at 19, 403 P.2d at 151, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 23. In an effort to distinguish Santor, the Seely
court stated that the only justification for the Santor holding was that the defendant-manufacturer
expressly represented the rug as "Grade #1." Id. at 17, 403 P.2d at 151, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 23,
Although it is not entirely clear in Santor, hOwever, it appears that the dealer, not the manufacturer,
made this representation. See Santor, 44 N.J. at 56-57, 207 A.2d at 307. Nevertheless, the point is
immaterial because the Santor decision was grounded in implied warranty, not express warranty.
" Seely, 63 Cal. 2d at 19, 403 P.2d at 152, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 24 (Peters, J., concurring and
dissenting).
89 Id. at 21, 403 P.2d at 153, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 25 (Peters, J., concurring and dissenting).
" Id. at 26, 403 P.2d at 156, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 28 (Peters, J., concurring and dissenting).
91 Id. at 27, 403 P.2d at 157, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 29 (Peters, J., concurring and dissenting).
92 Id. at 28, 403 P,2d at 158, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 30 (Peters, J., concurring and dissenting).
93 Id. at 27, 403 P.2d at 157, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 29 (Peters, J., concurring and dissenting).
" Id. at 25, 403 P.2d at 156, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 28 (Peters, J., concurring and dissenting). This
view comports with the Santor definition. See supra note 70.
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use of the product for the general purposes for which it was manufactured and not for
any particular requirement of the purchaser outside of the intended purposes. 95
Justice Peters concluded that, although Seely was a close case, he would have allowed
Seely to recover for economic loss in strict liability because he was an ordinary con-
sumer. 96 Even though the truck was to be used in his business, Justice Peters found it
persuasive that the plaintiff was the owner of a single truck and not a fleet-owner who
bought trucks regularly in the course of his business. He concluded that as the final link
in the marketing chain, Seely had no more bargaining power than an individual pur-
chasing a car on the retail leve1. 97 Accordingly, he would affirm the judgment but allow
Seely to recover for his direct and consequential economic loss on the basis of the strict
liability doctrine. 98
In summary, the Santor court's minority position would allow recovery for economic
loss in strict liability without regard to the type of harm incurred. In contrast, the Seely
majority employs a type-of-harm test in determining the applicability of the doctrine of
strict liability. If the harm is physical injury to property, the majority position will allow
recovery in strict liability. If the harm is merely economic loss, the majority position will
not allow the plaintiff to recover in strict liability and will limit the plaintiff to recovery
under the U.C.C. Disagreeing with the Seely majority type-of-harm approach, Justice
Peters in his concurring and dissenting opinion advocates a type-of-consumer test. Under
this test, if the plaintiff is an ordinary consumer with little bargaining power, he or she
will be allowed to recover his or her economic loss in strict liability. lf, however, the
plaintiff is a commercial consumer, he or she will be denied recovery in strict liability
and will be restricted to recovery under the U.C.C.
C. The Minority Following Santor
While the Seely decision denying recovery for economic loss in strict liability has
emerged as the majority view," the Santor decision allowing such recovery has attracted
the support of Michigan, Wisconsin, and Ohio. A review of the cases decided by the
minority of jurisdictions following Santor reveals these courts' general acceptance of
recovery for economic loss in strict liability and definite refusal of the type-of-harm
approach set forth by Seely. Because the fact patterns of these cases vary as to the type
of consumer complaining and the type of harm claimed, they present a far more
complicated situation than do cases involving an ordinary consumer seeking to recover
95 See Comment, The Vexing Problem, supra note 2, at 160.
96 Seely, 63 Cal. 2d at 27-28, 403 P.2d at 157-58, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 29-30 (Peters, J., concurring
and dissenting).
97 Id. at 28, 403 P.2d at 158, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 30 (Peters, J., concurring and dissenting).
96 Id. at 29, 403 P.2d at 158, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 30 (Peters, J., concurring and dissenting).
"See, e.g., Morrow v. New Moon Homes, Inc., 548 P.2d 279 (Alaska 1976) (U.C.C., not strict
liability, applies to suit for defective mobile home); Arrow Leasing Corp. v. Cummins Arizona
Diesel, Inc., 136 Ariz. 44, 666 P.2d 544 (1983) (economic loss not recoverable under products
liability law); Hiigel v. General Motors Corp., 190 Colo. 57, 544 P.2d 983 (1975) (commercial loss
not recoverable in strict liability); Chrysler Corp. v. Taylor, 141 Ga. App. 671, 234 S.E.2d 123
(1977) (loss of benefit of the bargain not recoverable in strict liability); Moorman Mfg. Co. v.
National Tank Co., 91 Ill. 2d 69, 61 Ill. Dec. 746, 435 N.E.2d 443 (1982) (economic loss not
recoverable under strict liability); Nobility Homes of Texas, Inc. v. Shivers, 557 S.W.2d 77 (Tex.
1977) (economic loss not recoverable in strict liability).
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for direct economic loss as found in Santor. Nevertheless, these cases hold unanimously
for recovery in strict liability.
For example, in a 1970 Michigan Appeals Court decision, Cava v. Harley Davidson
Motor a small commercial consumer recovered for direct economic loss under
what the court termed a "product liability" theory.'°' In Cova, the plaintiffs, doing
business as the Bob-o-Link Golf Course, purchased golf carts manufactured by the
defendant.'°2 The complaint alleged that the golf carts, purchased from a dealer for
rental purposes on the plaintiff's golf course, were defective and repeatedly required
repairs. The damages claimed were for the cost of repairs and rentals lost while the
carts were under repair.'" The trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground that
where the damages claimed are for economic loss, not personal injury, a consumer may
not maintain an action against the manufacturer for breach of warranty unless there is
privity of contract. 10'
Rejecting the trial court's reasoning, the Michigan Appeals Court reinstated the
complaint, 105 holding that a consumer can sue a manufacturer directly for economic loss
resulting from a defect in a product attributable to the manufacturer.'" The court
reasoned that a manufacturer should be required to stand behind its defectively-man-
ufactured product even though the product has caused neither accident nor personal
injury. The court further stated that a remote seller should not be insulated from direct
liability where he or she has merely mulcted the consumer.'°'
The Cova court conceded that the manufacturer's liability is a "strict liability or
something akin to it." 1 " The court refused to adopt, however, the strict liability label.'"
The court suggested that it might be more helpful to abandon the misleading tort and
contract terminology and simply refer to the manufacturer's liability as "product habil-
ity.
 "1 io This terminology, the court noted, would acknowledge not only that the liability
is an amalgam of tort and contract concepts, but also that it is sufficiently dissimilar to
those concepts that emphasis on the tort or contract origin is misleading."'
'" 26 Mich. App. 602, 182 N.W.2d 800 (1970).
I01 Id. at 614-15, 182 N.W.2d at 807.
102 Id. at 603, 182 N.W.2d at 801.
1G3 Id. at 604 n.l, 182 N.W.2d at 801 n.l.
lo Id. at 603-04, 182 N.W.2d at 801.
' 0 Id. at 604, 182 N.W.2d at 801.
we Id. at 609, 182 N.W.2d at 804.
1°7 Id,
1 "8 Id. at 612, 182 N.W.2d at 806. The appeals court defined the doctrine in terms of three
concepts:
1) the manufacturer's liability does not depend on proof of negligence; it is the same
kind of liability as arises from a breach of warranty, express or implied, or a false
representation, express or implied; '2) although traceable conceptually to warranty as
well as tort, this liability, imposed by law, is a tort liability, not dependent on the
existence of a contract or contract principles, and, thus, it arises independently of the
Uniform Sales Act and the Uniform Commercial Code; and 3) while it is not necessary
to prove negligence, the manufacturer is not absolutely liable. He is liable only if the
product is defective.
Id. at 611-12, 182 N.W.2d at 805-06.
109 1d. at 612, 182 N.W.2d at 806.
"D Id. at 614, 182 N.W.2d at 807.
", Id. at 614-15, 182 N.W.2d at 807.
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Regardless of the terminology, the Cova court would allow a consumer, in this case,
a small commercial consumer, to recover for direct economic loss." 2 While the Cova
plaintiffs also sought to recover lost profits, a consequential economic loss, the court
noted that the issue was not briefed and thus declined to address it. It noted however,
that the issue probably would require consideration whether there should be limitations
on the kinds of plaintiffs who will be permitted to recover consequential damages."
Basing its decision on Santor and Cova, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in its 1976
decision LaCrosse v. Schubert, Schroeder & Assoc."4
 held that a claim for pure economic
loss involving the cost of repair and replacement of the product itself, absent an allegation
of personal injury, is recoverable in strict liability." 5 In LaCrosse, the plaintiff city alleged
a cause of action against a general contractor, an architect, an installer, and a manufac-
turer arising out of the replacement of a school roof. The replacement roof leaked,
partly blew off, and eventually had to be replaced.' t6 The LaCrosse court, quoting Santor,
could find no sound reason for allowing recovery for personal injury but not for eco-
nomic loss."' The court reasoned that it should apply the principles of strict liability on
the basis of whether the manufacturer was "the father of the transaction," and not on
the basis of whether the plaintiff had incurred personal injury or economic loss." 8
Although the case involved direct economic loss, the court implied that it also would
allow consequential loss of profits." 8
As are the Michigan Cova case and Wisconsin LaCrosse case, the 1975 Ohio decision
Iacono v. Anderson Concrete Corp.I 2° is based on Santor. In Iacono, the plaintiff entered into
an oral contract for the installation of a driveway at the plaintiff's home. Soon after
completion, the plaintiff noticed round holes forming in the concrete.' 2 ' The Ohio
Supreme Court determined that the plaintiff's complaint alleged an action in tort based
upon the breach of an implied warranty.I 22
 The court decided that it could see no
rational basis for distinguishing between personal injury and property damage.'" The
Iacono court quoted Santor and noted the logic of not distinguishing a defective product
causing personal injury and a defective product that is merely worthless.'" Accordingly,
the court held that a plaintiff may maintain an action in tort, based on a theory of
implied breach of warranty, to recover for damages to property.'"
A United States District Court, applying Ohio law, explained and expanded the
Iacono case in Mead Corp. v. Allendale Mutual Insurance Co.'" The court held that a
I " Id. at 609, 182 N.W.2d at 804.
1E3 Id. at 620, 182 N.W.2d at 811.
"l 72 Wis. 2d 38, 240 N.W.2d 124 (1976).
"5 Id. at 44, 240 N.W.2d at 127.
116 Id. at 40, 240 N.W.2d at 125.
117 Id. at.45, 240 N.W.2d at 127 (quoting Santor, 44 N.J. at 60, 207 A.2d at 309).
" 8 /d. at 45, 240 N.W.2d at 128.
119 Id. at 44, 240 N.W.2d at 127. The court stated: "We are also of the opinion that a strict
liability claim for pure economic loss involving only the cost of repair or replacement of the product
itself and loss of profits is likewise not demurrable." Id.
120
 42 Ohio St. 2d 88, 326 N.E.2d 267 (1975).
121
 Id. at 88, 326 N.E.2d at 268.
in
 Id. at 91, 326 N.E.2d at 269.
," Id. at 93, 326 N.E.2d at 270.
144 Id. at 93, 326 N.E.2d at 270-71 (quoting Santor, 44 N.J. at 60, 207 A.2d at 309).
125 Id. at 93, 326 N.E.2d at 271.
"6 465 F. Supp. 355 (N.D. Ohio 1979).
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commercial consumer could recover for direct and consequential economic loss resulting
from the breakdown of a steam turbine manufactured by one of the delendants. 127 After
negotiations between the manufacturer of the turbine, the manufacturer of the generator
used in the turbine, and the plaintiff's technicians, the plaintiff entered into an agree-
ment to purchase the turbine.'" A contract provision limited liability to repair or re-
placement of defective parts and specifically excluded liability for consequential dam-
ages.'" Subsequently, the turbine suffered a breakdown.'" Because the warranty had
long since elapsed, the plaintiff repaired the turbine, but filed an action against the
manufacturers, the distributor, and the plaintiff's insurance company claiming direct
economic loss and consequential damages.' 3 ' The question before the court was whether
the defendant-manufacturers could be granted summary judgment on the tort claims
for economic loss. 132
Denying the defendant's motion, the Mead court declared that Ohio law clearly
allows recovery of economic loss under a strict liability theory.'" The court stated that
Iacono left no doubt about the recovery of economic loss in Ohio.'" The Mead court
reasoned that while the Iacono court labelled the recovery in Iacono as "property damage,"
the recovery was really direct economic loss because Iacono was seeking to recover the
difference between the value of what he had paid and the value of what he had received.
Accordingly, the court held that the plaintiff could bring an action under strict liability
in tort for the recovery of economic loss.'" Without discussion, the Mead court added
that it could see no logic to limiting a claimant's recovery to direct economic loss when
the plaintiff also had suffered indirect economic loss.'"
In summary, prior to Spring Motors Distributors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co.,'" the minority
of jurisdictions following Santor allowed recovery in strict liability for direct economic
loss. The Mead decision, expanding the Santor holding, allowed recovery for direct and
indirect economic loss. The types of consumer in these cases ranged From the ordinary
consumer in Iacono to the small commercial consumer in Cova to the large corporate
commercial consumer in Mead. None of these jurisdictions, however, set forth a test to
apply strict liability to cases of economic loss. Rather, based on the types of consumers
allowed to recover and the types of harm addressed, apparently these jurisdictions
broadly have accepted a general rule that consumers can recover for economic loss in
products liability. In doing so, these courts have flatly rejected a type-of-harm approach.
It is not as evident that they accept a type-of-consumer approach. These cases, however,
are not irreconcilable with a type-of-consumer test.
'" Id. at 367.
I" Id. at 357-59.
12" Id. at 358.
139 Id.
121 Id. at 359.
"2 1d.
1" Id. at 366. The Ohio Supreme Court adopted the § 402A Restatement version of strict
liability in Temple v. Wean United, Inc., 50 Ohio St. 2d 317, 364 N.E.2d 267 (1977). There, the
court indicated that there are virtually no distinctions between implied warranty in tort and strict
liability, Mead, 465 F. Supp. at 363 n.11 (citing Temple, 50 Ohio St. 2d at 322, 364 N.E.2d at 271).
134 Mead, 465 F. Supp. at 365.
12" Id. at 366.
'm Id.
1 " 98 N.J. 555, 489 A.2d 660 (1985).
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D. New Jersey Case Law Since Santor
Between Santor, decided in 1965, and Spring Motors, decided in 1985, the New Jersey
courts dealt sporadically with the issue of economic loss recovery. In two cases, Rosenau
v. City of New Brunswick and Gamon Meter Co.'" and Hemmer v. Uniroyal, Inc.,'" the issue
arose under a statute of limitations question in which the New Jersey Supreme Court
held that the U.C.C. statute of limitations did not govern either products liability action.
In addition, in Monsanto Co. v. Alden Leeds, Inc. 14° and ICI Australia Ltd. v. Elliott Overseas
Co., 141 the New Jersey Superior Court and a federal district court applying New Jersey
law held that commercial plaintiffs could recover their property losses under the doctrine
of strict liability. These cases indicate a willingness to restrict a U.C.C. recovery to a
commercial setting. Conversely, these cases can be seen as standing for the proposition
that recovery under the strict liability doctrine should be limited to a non-commercial
setting.
In Rosenau, the City of New Brunswick purchased sixty water meters from the
manufacturer, Worthington, in 1942. The city installed one of these meters in the
plaintiff's home in 1950, and in 1964 the meter broke, causing damage to the plaintiff's
property. The plaintiffs filed a complaint against Worthington alleging negligence and
strict liability, 142 but the trial court granted summary judgment for Worthington on the
ground that the statute of limitations barred the plaintiff's claim. 143 The plaintiffs ap-
pealed to the Appellate Division, which held that the statute of limitations did not bar
the plaintiff's claim insofar as it was grounded on negligence, but barred it insofar as it
was based on an allegation of a defect in manufacture without an accompanying alle-
gation of negligence.'"
On review, the New Jersey Supreme Court, addressing whether the plaintiffs were
entitled to maintain an action in strict liability, cited Santor for the rule that where a
manufacturer makes and distributes defective products, it may justly be held accountable
for injury proximately resulting to persons or property, despite absence of privity or a
showing of negligence.' 45 The Rosenau court continued, however, that the Rosenau plain-
tiffs — unlike the Santor plaintiffs — were not asserting any claim for economic loss, but
only for physical injury to their property which even Seely acknowledged is recoverable
under strict liability. Therefore, the court stated, for purposes of the present case, the
court need not revisit Santar. 146
The Rosenau court proceeded to define the action as one in strict liability, stating
that the limitation period of the U.C.C. was not intended to apply to tort actions between
consumers and manufacturers who were never in any commercial relationship or set-
ting.' 47 Accordingly, the court held that a claim grounded on strict liability in tort is
''" 51 N.J. 130, 238 A.2d 169 (1968).
'" 63 N.J. 130, 305 A.2d 412 (1973).
10 130 N.J. Super. 245, 326 A.2d 90 (Law Div. 1974).
141 551 F. Supp. 265 (1982).
12 Rosenau, 51 N.J. at 134, 238 A.2d at 171.
' 1' Id. at 135, 238 A.2d at 171.
"4 Id.
145 Id. (citing Santor, 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305).
'46 Id. at 142, 238 A.2d at 175 (citing Seely, 63 Cal. 2d at 19, 403 P.2d at 152, 45 Cal. Rptr. at
24).
" 7
 Id. at 143, 238 A.2d at 176.
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governed by the six-year limitation for injury to property.'" Because the cause of action
accrued in 1964, when the meter broke, the court found that the plaintiff's action,
instituted shortly thereafter, was timely."9 Although the judgment may result in a hard-
ship to Worthington, the court continued, one should not lose sight of the crucial fact
that Worthington originally placed the defective product in the stream of trade. The
Rosenau court reasoned that Worthington, as the manufacturer, was best situated to
protect against damage, whereas the injured parties were innocent and largely incapable
of protecting themselves.' 5°
Five years later, in the 1973 case of Heavner v. Uniroyal, Inc., 15 ' the New Jersey
Supreme Court again addressed the issue of the appropriate statute of limitations to be
applied in a products liability action and held that the U.C.C. limitation provision did
not apply. As in Rosenau, Heavner did not involve claims for economic loss. The plaintiff
in Heavner sought recovery in strict liability for personal injury and contemporaneous
damage to his vehicle alleged to have resulted from a defect in the tire, manufactured
by the defendant, which blew out and caused an accident. 152 The trial court granted the
defendant's motion to dismiss the personal injury count on the ground that the two-
year personal injury statute of limitations applied,'" rather than the U.C.C. four-year
provision. 154
On review, the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that the general statute of
limitations — two years for personal injury and six years for property damage —
controlled the plaintiffs action and consequently, the lower court was correct in dismissing
the personal injury claim.'" The court reasoned that the U.C.C. is commercially and
contractually oriented and its framework contemplates contracting parties in a conven-
tional commercial setting and claims based on economic loss.' 59 Thus, the Heavner court
stated, the U.C.C. cannot apply to a consumer action against a manufacturer for con-
sequential personal injury and property damage.' 57
The court stated that it would not reach the question whether the U.C.C. provision
applies to actions "merely for loss-of-the-bargain or economic damage in the commercial
sense."'" The court noted, however, Justice Peters' suggestion in his concurring and
dissenting opinion in Seely that the Code should never apply to situations involving the
ordinary consumer, but should be restricted to dealings between businesspeople and
merchants. The court suggested that under Justice Peters' reasoning, the plaintiff in
Hemmer would be considered an ordinary consumer.'"
Two decisions in the New Jersey lower courts allowed commercial plaintiffs to
recover their property losses in strict liability. In the first of these, the 1974 case of
' 48 Id. See N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A:14-1.
19 Rosenau, 51 N.J. at 144, 238 A.2d at 176.
' 50 Id. at 145, 238 A.2d at 176.
'S 1 63 N.J. 130, 305 A.2d 412 (1973).
1 " Id. at 133, 305 A.2d at 413.
'S 5
 See N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A:14-2.
154 63 N.J. at 133, 305 A.2d at 413. See U.C.C. 2-725 (1978). The suit began more than three
years after the accident, but less than four years from the delivery of the tires. Heavner, 63 N.J. at
134, 305 A.2d at 414.
I55 Hemmer, 63 N.J. at 156, 305 A.2d at 426.
139 Id. at 152-53, 305 A.2d at 424.
," Id, at 155, 305 A.2d at 426.
10 Id. at 157 n.16, 305 A.2d at 427 n.16.
159 Id.
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Monsanto Co. v. Alden Leeds, Inc., 1 " the defendant, counterclaiming on the plaintiff's
claim for recovery for the price of goods sold and delivered, alleged that a portion of
the chemicals purchased developed moisture problems and that chlorine gas escaped,
causing the chemicals to ignite spontaneously. A series of small fires and three larger
fires resulted in severe damage to buildings, equipment, electrical installations, raw
materials, and inventory.' 6 ' The plaintiff moved for summary judgment, but the court
stated that the real issue was contained in the defendant's counterclaim, namely, whether
a commecial user may maintain a claim for strict liability. 162
Citing Santor, the Monsanto court stated that the New Jersey Supreme Court had
shown itself willing to expand the field of strict liability in order to fulfill the public's
expectation of responsibility for products placed in the stream of commerce.' 63 Although
the courts of New Jersey had never applied the strict liability theory to a commercial
claimant,'" the Monsanto court noted, Santor easily would be applied as extending strict
liability to a commercial consumer's loss.'" The court reasoned that injuries to an
individual's business can be as detrimental to society and as devastating to the individual
as injuries to his or her person. Therefore, the court stated, the liability for economic
as well as personal injury belongs with the manufacturer who can in turn, through
insurance, spread the cost of injury due to defective products throughout the distributive
chain.' 66
 In conclusion, the Monsanto court stated that the extent to which strict liability
will be applied to a consequential loss is ultimately up to the parties, for they still have
bargaining positions from which they may allocate the loss. 167
 Therefore, the Monsanto
court held, defective products should give rise to liability to be borne by the enterprise
which created the products, unless there is a valid allocation of the risk of loss between
the contracting parties.'"
Relying on Santor and Monsanto, a United States district court of New Jersey held
that strict liability was available to commercial consumers under New Jersey law in ICI
Australia Ltd. v. Elliott Overseas Co.'" The ICI Australia plaintiff, a company engaged in
the manufacture of ethylene used in the production of plastics and vinyl, entered into
an agreement with the defendant to update a certain assemblage of equipment at the
plaintiff's plant. When a defective coupling failed, the plaintiff brought an action against
the defendant in strict liability.'" The trial court stated that the law in New Jersey, as
laid down in Santor, provides that a strict liability claim is available in a case involving
solely economic loss. Noting that Monsanto came down on the side of applying strict
liability to a commercial consumer, the ICI Australia court stated that there is a strong
indication that strict liability actions are available to commercial consumers in New Jersey.
The court continued, however, that the primary consideration in determining if strict
liability is available is whether the alleged defect rendered the product unreasonably
1" 130 N.J. Super. 245, 326 A.2d 90 (Law Div. 1974).
16, Id. at 249, 326 A.2d at 92.
162 Id. at 250, 326 A.2d at 92.
163
 Id. at 256, 326 A.2d at 96.
164 Id. at 257, 326 A.2d at 96.
'" Id. at 259, 326 A.2d at 97.
I" Id.
167 Id. at 259, 326 A.2d at 98.
166 Id. at 260, 326 A.2d at 98.
'" 551 F. Supp. 265 (D.N.J. 1982).
126 Id. at 266.
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dangerous."' Using the nature of the defect and the type of risk imposed as the guiding
factors, the ICI Australia court held that the plaintiff produced sufficient evidence to
demonstrate that the damage to its property was of a sudden and severe nature. 172 The
court found that although no one was physically injured, the risk and damage which did
occur were sufficient to give rise to a strict liability claim in New jersey.'"
In summary, prior to Spring Motors, New Jersey case law stemming from Santor has
allowed commercial consumers to recover in strict liability, as seen in Monsanto and IC/
Australia. These plaintiffs suffered property damage, however, not pure economic loss.
It is well settled that property damage is recoverable in strict liability. 174 Although the
plaintiffs in Monsanto and ICI Australia were commercial consumers, because they did
not claim economic loss their recovery in strict liability has not expanded the Santor
holding to include recovery in strict liability for economic loss suffered by commercial
consumers.
While the New Jersey decisions have not produced any guidelines for the applica-
bility of strict liability, the courts consistently have held that the availability of a U.C.C.
remedy is reserved for commercial settings.' 75 Therefore, the courts in Rosenau and
Heavner, applying this rule, held that the plaintiffs, who were ordinary consumers, were
not subject to the U.C.C. statute of limitations. 176 Moreover, the availability of a strict
liability remedy could be seen as dependent upon a non-commercial setting, although
the courts have not so held expressly. Thus, a commercial consumer seeking recovery
for economic loss in strict liability will be denied such recovery and be restricted to a
U.C.C. remedy.
11. THE NEW JERSY SUPREME COURT'S REASONING IN SPRING MOTORS
A. The Majority Opinion
In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court of New Jersey in the 1985 case of
Spring Motors Distributors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Ca. held that a commercial consumer seeking
damages for economic loss resulting from the purchase of a defective product may not
recover tinder the doctrine of strict liability and is restricted to a cause of action under
the U.C.C.' 77 The opinion of the court, delivered by Justice Pollack, began its discussion
of the validity of an exclusive U.C.C. remedy by recognizing the comprehensive structure
of the Code. The court noted that within its comprehensive scheme, the Code provides
not only for the existence of warranties running to the consumer, but also for the remedy
available for a breach of those warranties.'" The court observed that in a proper case,
the buyer may recover the difference between the value of the defective goods and the
,71 Id. at 268.
"2 Id. See infra note 228 for a similar holding by the Alaska Supreme Court.
05 (CI Australia, 551 F,Supp. at 268.
"4 See, e.g., Seely, 63 Cal. 2d at 19, 403 P.2d at 152, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 24. See also W. PROSSER,
supra note 4, at 666.
175 Rosenau, 51 N.J. at 143, 238 A.2d at 176; Heavner, 63 N.J. at 152-53, 305 A.2d at 424.
176 Rosenau, 51 N.J. at 143, 238 A.2d at 176; Heavner, 63 N.J. at 152-53, 305 A.2d at 424.
177 98 N.J. 555, 578, 489 A.2d 660, 672 (1985). The court also held that the plaintiff could nut
recover in negligence. Id. at 581, 489 A.2d at 673. This casenote will not discuss the plaintiff's
negligence claim.
" Id. at 565-66, 489 A.2d at 665. See U.C.C. § 2-313 (1978) (express warranty); § 2-314
(implied warranty of merchantability); § 2-315 (fitness for a particular purpose).
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value they would have had if they had been as warranted,'" incidental damages, which
include reasonable expenses incidental to the breach,'" and consequential damages,
including losses resulting from the buyer's need of which the seller had knowledge'
and injury to property. 182 Defining the types of economic loss recoverable for warranty
under the Code, the Spring Motors court stated that economic loss can take the form of
either direct or consequential damages. While direct economic loss includes the first of
the enumerated damages, the loss of the benefit of the bargain, consequential economic
loss includes such indirect losses as loss of profits, the court noted.'" While recognizing
that a claim for economic loss is not normally recoverable in tort, the court stated that
this case probed the boundary between the U.C.C. and strict liability and, thus, required
a delineation of that boundary.'"
Turning to a brief history of the doctrine of strict liability in New Jersey, the Spring
Motors court first noted the landmark decision of Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc."
In Henningsen, the New Jersey Supreme Court allowed a plaintiff to recover damages
for injuries sustained when the car driven by the plaintiff lost its steering and crashed
into a wal1. 186 The court based its holding on a theory of implied warranty of merchant-
ability even though the plaintiff was not in privity with the manufacturer.'" The Spring
Motors court stated that underlying the Henningsen decision was the recognition that
consumers are not always in an equal bargaining position with manufacturers and
dealers.'" Secondly, the court observed, Henningsen declared that one of the main
purposes of strict liability is the allocation of the risk and distribution of the loss to the
better risk-bearer,'" The Spring Motors court pointed out that the manufacturer is better
able to eliminate defects from its products and spread the cost of the risk among its
customers; the consumer, on the other hand, because of his or her unequal bargaining
power, cannot protect himself or herself.'" Thus, the Spring Motors court noted, strict
liability achieves its objective of allocating the risk of loss to the better risk bearer, the
manufacturer, thereby protecting the consumer.' 91
The Spring Motors court stated that five years after the Henningsen decision, the court
decided Santor v. A. & M. Karagheusian, 192 in which the court acknowledged that although
the action was couched in terms of a breach of implied warranty, it could be described
179 U.C.C. § 2-714 (1978).
180 U.C.C. § 2-715 (1978).
181 U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(a) (1978).
182 U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(b) (1978); Spring Motors, 98 N.J. at 566, 489 A.2d at 665.
183 98 N.J. at 566, 489 A.2d at 665. (citing J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE H 11-4 to 11-6 at 405-10 (2d ed. 1980)).
184 /d. at 566, 489 A.2d at 665-66.
11" Id. at 566, 489 A.2d at 666 (citing Henningsen, 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960)).
in Henningsen, 32 NJ. at 384, 161 A.2d at 84.
187 Id.
L" Spring Motors, 98 N.J. at 567, 489 A.2d at 666. This point was particularly relevant in
Henningsen where the car dealer required the consumer to sign a standard contract used by the
entire automobile industry. See Henningsen, 32 N.J. at 374-75, 161 A.2d at 78.
189 Spring Motors, 98 N.J. at 567, 489 A.2d at 666 (citing Henningsen, 32 N.J. at 379, 161 A.2d
at 81).
loctird. at 567-68, 489 A.2d at 666.
1 91 Id. at 568, 489 A.2d at 666.
I92 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965). See supra notes 54-72 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Santor.
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better as one in strict liability.'" The Spring Motors court noted that, in Santor, Justice
Francis made it clear that personal injury to the consumer was not essential to the
invocation of strict liability.'" The court further noted, however, that the plaintiff in
Santor, as in Henningsen, was an individual consumer and the action was for direct
economic loss.'"
The Spring Motors court next distinguished two cases in which the court held that
strict liability, not the U.C.C., should apply to an action between a consumer and a
manufacturer who were not in privity.'" The court observed that in the first of these
cases, Rosenau v. City of New Brunswick & Gamon Meter Ca.,'" the plaintiff's action was
for physical harm to property, not for economic loss.'" In Rosenau, a homeowner brought
an action in negligence and strict liability against the manufacturer of water meters sold
to a municipality for its water system, when one of the meters broke and caused property
damage to the plaintiff's home.'" Quoting from Justice Jacob's opinion in Rosenau, the
Spring Motors court stated that the U.C.C. presumably was not intended to apply to
actions between consumers and manufacturers who never were in a commercial rela-
tionship. 200
In the second case, Heavner v. Uniroyal, Inc., 2°' the Spring Motors court found that
the two-year statute of limitations applicable to personal injury actions in tort 2" and not
the four-year period provided by the U.C.C. 2" was the proper time period to apply in
an action against a manufacturer for damages to a truck and personal injuries to its
driver caused by a tire blow-out. 2" The Spring Motors court was careful to point out that
although the U.C.C. statute of limitations does not apply to actions in strict liability for
personal injury and property damage, the Heavner court did not reach the question
whether it applied to actions for economic loss. 205 In conclusion, the court stated that
neither Rosenau nor Heavner involved a claim for economic loss between commercial
parties. 20°
From the injured consumer's perspective, the Spring Motors court explained, strict
liability provides a more congenial environment for recovery than do contract princi-
ples.207 According to the court, the Code poses three obstacles to a buyer: the require-
ments of privity with the manufacturer and notice to the seller for a breach of warranty, 2"
193 Spring Motors, 98 N.J. at 568, 489 A.2d at 666.
194 Id.
195 Id. at 568, 489 A.2d at 667.
um Id. at 569, 489 A.2d at 667.
' 97 51 N.J. 130, 238 A.2d 169 (1968).
'99
	 Motors, 98 N.J. at 569, 489 A.2d at 667.
1" Id. (citing Rosenau, 51 N.J. at 143, 238 A.2d at 176). See supra text accompanying notes 140-
50 for a discussion of Rosenau.
209
	 Motors, 98 N.J. at 569, 489 A.2d at 667 (quoting Rosenau, 51 N.J. at 143, 238 A.2d at
176).
201 63 N.J. 130, 305 A.2d 412 (1973). See supra text accompanying notes 152-59 for a discussion
of Heavner.
'on See N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A:14-2.
205 See N.J. STAT. ANN. 12A:2-725.
104 Spring Motors, 98 N.J. at 569, 489 A.2d at 667 (citing Hemmer, 63 N.J. at 156-57, 305 A.2d
at 426-27).
205 Id. at 570, 489 A.2d at 667 (citing Heavner, 63 N.J. at 157 n.16, 305 A.2d at 427 n.16).
2" Id.
1" Id. at 570, 489 A.2d at 668.
" See U.C.C. § 2.607(3) (1978).
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and the availability of disclaimers of liability made by the seller.2" The court explained
that a buyer who does not deal directly with a manufacturer cannot negotiate over the
terms of the disclaimer and might find it impossible to give the manufacturer notice.")
On the other hand, the court explained, the principle that parties should be free to
make contracts of their choice, including contracts disclaiming liability, underlies the
Code. Moreover, the court noted, once an agreement is reached, society has an interest
in seeing that it is fulfilled. Consequently, in the court's view, the U.C.C. is the more
appropriate vehicle for resolving commercial disputes between persons within the dis-
tributive chain. 211
Attempting to ascertain where on the spectrum to place a cause of action for purely
economic loss brought by a commercial entity, the Spring Motors court turned to a
discussion of Santor and Seely. 2 t 2 The court concluded, however, that it need not recon-
sider the Santor rule that an ordinary consumer may recover in strict liability for direct
economic loss, because Spring Motors involved an action by a commercial consumer. The
court emphasized that instead, it must reconsider the policies underlying the U.C.C. and
strict liability and specifically, the relative bargaining power of the parties and the
allocation of the loss to the better risk-bearer.213
Evaluating the policy of relative bargaining power, the Spring Motors court stated
that the considerations that give rise to strict liability are not relevant in an action between
commercial parties with comparable bargaining power. 214 Furthermore, according to the
court, perfect parity is not necessary to a determination that parties have comparable
bargaining power. Without determining the relevant circumstances for determining
bargaining power, the court found it persuasive that Spring Motors had sufficient bar-
gaining power to persuade Ford to install Clark transmissions in the trucks. 212
The court then examined risk allocation and concluded that Spring Motors was at
least as well-situated as the defendants to assess the impact of economic loss. Indeed,
the court noted that a commercial buyer such as Spring Motors may be better situated
than the manufacturer to factor into its price the risk of economic loss. 216 Observing that
the price paid by Spring Motors for the trucks reflected the fact that Ford was liable for
repair or replacement of parts only, the court stated that by seeking to impose the risk
of loss on Ford, Spring Motors sought to obtain a better bargain than it originally had
made. Accordingly, the court concluded that as between commercial parties, the alloca-
tion of risks in accordance with the agreement better serves the public interest. 212
The court then noted that it is necessary to look not only at the policy considerations
behind the U.C.C., but also at the role of the legislature in enacting the U.C.C. The
court stated that allowing Spring Motors to recover from Ford under tort principles
209 See U.C.C. § 2-316 (1978); Spring Motors, 98 N.J. at 570, 489 A.2d at 668.
210 Spring Motors, 98 N.J. at 570, 489 A.2d at 668.
211 Id. at 571, 489 A.2d at 668.
212 Id. at 571-75, 489 A.2d at 668-70. See supra notes 54-98 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Santor and Seely.
215 Spring Motors, 98 N.J. at 575, 489 A.2d at 670.
214 Id, at 576, 489 A.2d at 670 (citing Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co.,
360 F. Supp. 25, 32 (S.D. Iowa 1973)).
215 id. at 576, 489 A.2d at 671.
216 Id. (citing Note, Economic Loss, supra note 51, at 952-58). See infra notes 260-62 and accom-
panying text.
217 Spring Motors, 98 N.J. at 576, 489 A.2d at 670.
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would abrogate the Code's requirement that the buyer give notice of the breach and
would deprive the seller of its statutory ability to limit his liability. Summarizing, the
Spring Motors court observed that the U.C.C. represents a comprehensive statutory
scheme that satisfies the needs of the world of commerce and that courts should pause
before displacing that legislative scheme. 2 ' 8
Turning to the Appellate Division's opinion which allowed the case to proceed under
strict liability principles, the Spring Motors court stated that the lower court erred in
several respects."' First, the court noted, the Appellate Division relied too heavily on
Senior, which did not consider the effect of the U.C.C. on a commercial transaction. 220
Second, the court stated, the Appellate Division misplaced its reliance on three New
jersey cases. 221 The first of these cases, H. Rosenblum Inc, v. Adler,222 involved the liability
of a public accountant for the negligent auditing of financial statements. The Spring
Motors court pointed out that Rosenblum turned on principles of negligent misrepresen-
tation, not on strict liability, and therefore the case did not implicate the policy consid-
erations that underlie strict liability. 223 The court then distinguished the second case,
Monsanto Co. v. Alden Leeds, 224 because it involved property damage, which is recoverable
in strict liability for both commercial and ordinary consumers. 225 The court also distin-
guished ICI Australia Ltd. v. Elliott Overseas Co. 226 because it involved both an accident
and property damage, neither of which were present in Spring Motors. 227 The court
further stated that cases allowing recovery in strict liability involving claims for potential
personal injury — claims that Spring Motors does not assert — are distinguishable. 228
Consequently, the court held that a commercial buyer seeking damages for economic
loss may only proceed under the U.C.C. against parties in a chain of distribution and
reversed the part of the judgment of the Appellate Division that permitted Spring Motors
to maintain an action in strict liability.229
Finally, the Spring Motors court stated that it need not determine the outer limits of
a suit by an ultimate purchaser against a remote supplier for economic loss. Therefore,
the court reserved determination of the effect of a remote manufacturer's disclaimer or
limitation on warranties to a purchaser who did not have the opportunity to negotiate
the terms of the agreement. 2" The court also left unreviewed the Code requirement of
218 Id. at 577, 489 A.2d at 671.
2 ' 9 /d.
22° Id.
221 Id. at 577-78, 489 A.2d at 671-72.
222 93 N.J. 324, 461 A.2d 138 (1983).
225 Spring Motors, 98 N.j. at 577, 489 A.2d at 671.
225 130 N.J. Super. 245, 326 A.2d 90 (Law Div. 1974). See supra text accompanying notes 160-
168 for a discussion of Monsanto.
225 Spring Motors, 98 N.J. at 578, 489 A.2d at 672. See supra notes 160-68 and accompanying
text.
226 551 F. Supp. 265 (D.N.J. 1982). See supra notes 169-73 and accompanying text for a
discussion of IC/ Australia.
222 Spring Motors, 98 N.J. at 578, 489 A.2d at 672.
222 Id. (Citing Kodiak Elec. Ass'n v. DeLaval Turbine, Inc., 694 1 2 .2d 150, 153-54 (Alaska 1984)
(denying summary judgment seeking dismissal of strict liability claim brought by commercial con-
sumer for failure of electric generator where there was serious danger to persons, although no
actual injury)).
226 Id. at 578-79, 489 A.2d at 672.
"° Id. at 588, 489 A.2d at 677.
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notice and whether a warranty of fitness for a particular purpose extends only to parties
in privity."' Concluding that a commercial buyer may maintain an action for purely
economic loss only under the U.C.C., and not in strict liability, the court held that the
appropriate period of limitation is that provided by the Code."' Because this period
had expired, the court reversed the judgment of the Appellate Division and reinstated
the dismissal of the complaint as to all defendants.'"
B. The Concurring Opinion
Justice Handler's concurring opinion agreed with the majority's conclusion under
the particular circumstances of the case. 234 Justice Handler observed that there was
nothing in the facts to suggest that the transaction between these experienced parties
was other than a common commercial event for them. Furthermore, Justice Handler
noted, the contract specification that Ford equip the trucks with Clark transmissions
made it apparent that Spring Motors had commercial experience, economic status, and
bargaining power.'"
23 ' Id. at 589, 489 A.2d at 677.
232 Id. at 582, 489 A.2d at 674.
233
 Id. at 589, 489 A.2d at 677. The court noted that the trial court dismissed Spring Motors'
claim against Clark because of a lack of privity. Id. at 582, 489 A.2d at 674. Although Spring Motors
did not pursue the issue, the court concluded that the absence of privity between a remote supplier
and an ultimate purchaser should not preclude the extension to the purchaser of the supplier's
warranties made to the manufacturer. Id. The court stated that it reached that conclusion even
though the U.C.C. generally applies to parties in privity. Id. The court pointed out that the drafters
of the Code specifically stated that the section relating to privity, U.C.C. § 2-318, is "'neutral and is
not intended to enlarge or restrict the developing case law on whether the seller's warranties, given
to his buyer who resells, extends to other persons in the distributive chain.'" Spring Motors, 98 N.J.
at 584, 489 A.2d at 675 (quoting U.C.C. § 2-318, comment 3).
The court reasoned that it is consistent with the principles underlying Santor and with the
intent of the Code's drafters to recognize a claim under the U.C.C. for economic loss in a breach
of warranty action without regard to vertical privity — the relationship that exists between parties
in a distributive chain, that is, between a manufacturer, wholesaler, retailer, and ultimate buyer. Id.
at 586, 489 A.2d at 676. The court added that to the extent that a plaintiff in a suit for breach of
warranty against a remote seller need not establish privity, the court's recognition of a warranty
action for economic loss by a commercial buyer parallels the recognition in Santar of a similar claim
by a consumer. Id. Furthermore, the court observed, eliminating the requirement of vertical privity
is particularly appropriate where Spring Motors read advertisements published by Clark, specifically
requested a Clark transmission, and contracted with Ford only. Id. at 587, 489 A.2d at 676-77. The
court explained that given the nature of the transaction and the expectations of the parties, the
absence of a direct contractual relationship should not preclude Spring Motors from asserting a
cause of action for breach of express warranty against Clark. Id. at 587, 489 A.2d at 677.
234 Id. at 589, 489 A.2d at 678 (Handler, J., concurring). While Justice Handler agreed with
the majority's result, however, he disagreed with the majority's elimination of a requirement of
privity. Id. at 591, 489 A.2d at 678-79 (Handler, J., concurring). Stating that he did not denigrate
the jurisprudential significance of the elimination of direct privity as a basis for an action under
the U.C.C., he nevertheless felt that under the circumstances of this case, the majority may have
exaggerated the potential bar to the action of the privity requirement. Id. He reasoned that although
Spring Motors and Clark did not contract directly with each other, Clark was a party to the
transaction acting through Ford at the direction of Spring Motors, thus satisfying a nexus required
by the privity rule. Id.
235 Id. at 590, 489 A.2d at 678 (Handler, J., concurring).
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Justice Handler emphasized that the Spring Motors court's selection of a remedy did
not turn on a label. Therefore, he noted, it would be incorrect to consider the U.C.C.
remedy to be applicable exclusively to a purchaser's claim simply because the transaction
could be viewed as commercial or because the ultimate purchaser is a commercial entity.
Rather, Justice Handler argued, the analysis should turn on whether a purchase made
in that kind of setting, even if for a business or commercial purpose, is sufficiently
distinguishable from a purchase for personal use by an ordinary private consumer to
justify a difference in remedial treatment."6
Justice Handler then turned to a discussion of Justice Peters' concurring and dis-
senting opinion in Seely, and observed that Justice Peters' reasoning is parallel to that of
Spring Motors, Justice Handler noted that reasons given as justification for limiting
commercial purchasers to U.C.C. remedies suggest conversely that the U.C.C. may be
inapplicable in cases involving purchasers different from those in Spring Motors. 237 Spe-
cifically, he continued, a court should consider not only whether the transaction is
commercial, but also whether the parties are commercially experienced and have com-
paratively equal bargaining power."8 Bargaining power, Justice Handler noted, is es-
pecially significant in light of the seller's ability to disclaim its liability in warranty. Often,
the concurrence observed, the ultimate purchaser will not have had the opportunity to
negotiate with the remote supplier and often will be unaware of warranty exclusions in
the contract between the remote supplier and the distributor. 239 In conclusion, Justice
Handler stated that the use of such asserted disclaimers may militate against the use of
U.C.C. remedies entirely. 94° The concurrence also noted that special problems may occur
with respect to warranties of fitness for a particular purpose, which require that a seller
must know at the time of contract the purpose for which the goods are required and,
in addition, that the purchaser must rely on the seller's judgment in making its selection.
Justice Handler stated that a remote purchaser often will not be in such a relation with
the seller. 241
Justice Handler next discussed risk allocation. Where the parties do not bargain
with comparable economic strength, Justice Handler stated, the inferior risk-bearing
position of the aggrieved party may militate in favor of continuing common-law avenues
of relief. 242 In conclusion, Justice Handler explained that one can foresee situations in
which a defective product will cause economic harm to a purchaser who should not be
denied access to strict liability in light of the inadequacy of the U.C.C. relief, Justice
Handler pointed out that his analysis is not inconsistent with the court's opinion, which
focuses on the factors of equal bargaining power and ability to allocate risks in applying
the U.C.C. If those factors are not present in a given case, Justice Handler reasoned,
alternative modes of recovery, such as strict liability, should be available. Therefore,
Justice Handler concluded, consumers who are not in a position to protect themselves
against economic loss should not be denied the ameliorative reach of the law simply
because they are also commercial consumers 243
236 Id. at 592, 489 A.2d at 679 (Handler, J., concurring).
237 Id. at 593, 489 A.2d at 679 (Handler, J., concurring).
238 Id. at 593, 489 A.2d at 680 (Handler, J., concurring).
232 Id. at 594, 489 A.2d at 680 (Handler, J., concurring).
242 Id. at 595, 489 A.2d at 680 (Handler, J., concurring).
241 ird,
442 Id. at 595-96, 489 A.2d at 681 (Handler, J., concurring).
443 Id. at 596, 489 A.2d at 681 (Handler, J., concurring).
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HI. TYPE-OF-HARM/TYPE-OF-CONSUMER TESTS
A. Policy Reasons Underlying the Application of Strict Liability
In Spring Motors, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that a commercial consumer
seeking damages for economic loss resulting from the purchase of a defective product
may not recover under the doctrine of strict liability." 4 In reaching this conclusion, the
court reconsidered the policy reasons underlying the doctrine of strict liability, specifically
the bargaining power of the parties and the allocation of loss to the better risk-bearer. 245
The Spring Motors court consequently found that these policy reasons, in the context of
a transaction involving a commercial consumer, argue against allowing recovery in strict
liability.246
The next section of this casenote will analyze the reasoning of the Spring Motors
court. In effect, Spring Motors used a "type-of-consumer test" as the standard for deter-
mining whether a plaintiff should be allowed to recover in strict liability for economic
loss. Significantly, Spring Motors clarifies that courts should define a type of consumer
based on his or her ability to bargain and bear risks. This section will evaluate the court's
conclusion that the policy reasons underlying the doctrine of strict liability do not obtain
for a commercial consumer. Finally, the section will apply the type-of-consumer test
employed by Spring Motors to the minority of jurisdictions that allow recovery in strict
liability for economic loss. In conclusion, application of the type-of-consumer test unifies
the minority holdings.
The conflict between the Seely majority position denying economic loss recovery in
strict liability and the Santor minority position allowing such a recovery can be explained
as a distinction made between a "type-of-harm" and a "type-of-consumer" approach to
defining economic loss. The Seely "type-of-harm" approach posits that the kind of loss
suffered should determine the availability of strict liability.247 If the loss is physical injury,
the Seely jurisdictions, employing the type-of-harm test, permit recovery in strict habil-
ity. 248 If the loss is economic, the proper remedy under the type-of-harm test is the
recovery available under the U.C.C., because the U.C.C. is well-equipped to handle the
needs of commercial transactions. 749
On the other hand, the jurisdictions that employ the Santor type-of-consumer ap-
proach agree that the U.C.C. was developed to meet the needs of "commercial transac-
tions," but contend that courts should look to the transaction to determine if it is
commercia1. 250 Under the type-of-consumer approach, the characterization of the trans-
action is dependent on the type of consumer that is a party to the transaction. Therefore,
if the consumer is an ordinary consumer, he or she may recover in strict liability. If the
consumer is a commercial consumer, he or she may recover under the U.C.C. 25 '
While the type-of-harm and type-of-consumer tests may be easily summarized, an
evaluation of not only the validity, but also the fairness of each test, necessitates an
244 Spring Motors, 98 N.J. 555, 578, 489 A.2d 660, 672 (1985).
245 Id. at 575, 489 A.2d at 670.
246
	 at 576, 989 A.2d at 670.
247 See supra notes 73-98 and accompanying text for a discussion of Seely.
248 Seely, 63 Cal. 2d 9, 18, 403 P.2d 195, 151, 45 Cal. Rptr 17, 23 (1965).
249 Id. at 16, 403 P.2d at 150, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 22.
250
	 at 26, 403 P.2d at 156, 45 Cat. Rptr. at 28 (Peters, J., concurring and dissenting).
2" Id. at 27, 403 P.2d at 157, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 29 (Peters, J., concurring and dissenting).
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understanding of the policies underlying each approach. The type-of-harm test is based
on the belief that the doctrine of strict liability is grounded upon a need to compensate
victims of personal injury, while the U.C.C. is designed to govern the economic relations
between suppliers and consumers of goods. 252 Yet, the U.C.C. provides many obstacles
to recovery, including disclaimers of liability 255 and limitations on damages. 254 For ex-
ample, in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products 255 if the court had relied upon the U.C.C.'s
warranty theory of recovery, then the plaintiff, an ordinary consumer suffering personal
injury, would have been denied recovery because he did not give sufficient notice of the
breach.256 Thus, an injured consumer may require a strict liability remedy because sales
law often bars recovery to one who is not "steeped in business practice." 257 Nevertheless,
the policy considerations underlying strict liability mandate that courts apply the doctrine
to situations other than personal injury cases. Greenman provides two policy reasons for
such a result: the doctrine of strict liability will insure that the costs of injuries resulting
from defective products are borne by the manufacturers that put such products on the
market and protect consumers who are powerless to protect themselves. 256
Certainly, these policy reasons for imposing strict liability are relevant when the type
of harm suffered is personal injury. A person not anticipating injury is powerless to
protect himself or herself against injury or to insure his or her recovery by entering into
a favorable contract. In addition, the better risk-bearer of the cost of personal injury
always will be the manufacturer. Risk-bearing is usually defined in terms of the manu-
facturer's ability to eliminate defects from its product and spread the cost of risk among
its customers. 259 As one commentator has pointed out, today, the ability to bear the risk
is synonymous with the ability to insure. 266 In the case of personal injury, a manufacturer
is better able to insure against the risk of injury than the injured party because the
probability that personal injury will result and the probable amount of damages are
fairly predictable. 261 On the other hand, from the victim's point of view, the probability
of injury is so small as to make it non-insurable and the ability to pass on the cost to the
victim's enterprise may be non-existent. 262
Clearly then, the doctrine of strict liability appropriately fills the need to compensate
personally injured plaintiffs. The policy reasons supporting the doctrine are not limited
"2 Id. at 15, 403 P.2d at 149, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 21.
255 U.C.C. § 2-316(3)(c) (1978) provides: "an implied warranty can also be excluded or modified
by course of dealing or course of performance or usage of trade."
254 U.C.C. § 2-719(3) (1978) provides: "Consequential damages may be limited or excluded
unless the limitation or exclusion is unconscionable. Limitation of consequential damages for injury
to the person in the case of consumer goods is prima fade unconscionable but limitation of damages
where the loss is commercial is not."
2s5
	
Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
256 Id. at 60, 377 P.2d at 899, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 699. The California legislature did not adopt the
U.C.C. until 1965. The California court decided Greenman under the Uniform Sales Act. The
U.C.C. provision for notice, similar to the provision of the Uniform Sales Act to which Greenman
referred, is found in § 2.607(3), which reads: "Where a tender had been accepted (a) the buyer
must within a reasonable time after he discovers or should have discovered any breach notify the
seller of breach or be barred from any remedy • ..." U.C.C. 2-607(3) (1978).
257
	
59 Cal. 2d at 61, 377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700.
259 Id. at 63, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
259 See Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 379, 161 A.2d 69, 81 (1960).
26° See Note, Economic Loss, supra note 51, at 952-58.
26 ' Id. at 955.
262 Id.
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to the personal injury situation, however. A plaintiff suffering economic harm may be
just as powerless to protect himself or herself and just as powerless to bear the risk of
harm. Therefore, if the policy reasons for strict liability are present, courts should apply
the doctrine.
In advocating a type-of-consumer test, Justice Peters' concurring and dissenting
opinion in Seely identified the same policy reasons for allowing an ordinary consumer to
recover economic loss in strict liability as did the court in Greenman in allowing an
ordinary consumer to recover for personal injury in strict liability. 263 In particular, courts
impose strict liability to protect people who are "powerless to protect themselves." 264
 As
Justice Peters wrote, the restrictive provisions of warranty should not apply to ordinary
consumers, "who [are] usually unable to protect [themselves] from insidious contractual
provisions ... foisted upon [them] by commercial enterprises whose bargaining power
[they are] seldom able to match . . "2" Thus, courts should equate a consumer's inability
to protect himself or herself with an inequality of bargaining power. If the consumer is
unable to protect himself or herself because of a lack of bargaining power, then the
policy reasons for imposing strict liability are present. For example, the court in Seely
should have classified the plaintiff as an ordinary consumer who should recover in strict
liability because, even though he purchased the truck for his business, he was an owner
of a single truck and not a fleet-owner who bought trucks regularly in the course of his
business. 266
The size of the business or the number of trucks owned is not the only basis for
determining the nature of the consumer. As the operator of a fleet of 300 vehicles in its
business of leasing and selling trucks, Spring Motors appears to be a commercial con-
sumer and should be unable to recover economic loss under the doctrine of strict liability.
Indeed, this is the conclusion that the Spring Motors court reaches, but its conclusion
turns not on the size of the business or the number of trucks owned, but on the policy
reasons behind the label "commercial consumer." The policy reasons relevant in Spring
Motors are the relative bargaining power of the parties and the allocation of the loss to
the better risk-bearer. 267 While these policy reasons give rise to strict liability in the case
of an ordinary consumer, they do not obtain in situations involving agreements between
commercial parties. 268 In Spring Motors, the court fails to set out a standard for deter-
mining when parties have equal bargaining power, finding it sufficient that Spring Motors
had enough bargaining power to persuade Ford to install Clark transmissions in the
trucks Y69 In other words, Spring Motors had enough bargaining power to negotiate the
terms of the contract.
Significantly, while it appears that Spring Motors had the bargaining power to specify
its needs, it failed to negotiate some of the same U.C.C. requirements that present such
obstacles to recovery to those who do not have the power to negotiate. Specifically, the
warranties offered by Ford and Clark disclaim all other warranties, limit recovery to
265 Seely, 63 Cal. 2d at 27, 403 P.2d at 157, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 29 (Peters, J., concurring and
dissenting).
26.5
265
 Id.
286
	
at 28, 403 P.2d at 157-58, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 29-30 (Peters, J., concurring and dissenting).
"7 Spring Motors, 98 N.J. 555, 575, 489 A.2d 660, 670 (1985).
464 Id. at 576, 489 A.2d at 670.
469 Id. at 576, 489 A.2d at 671.
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repair and replacement, and disclaim consequential damages. 27° Presumably, Spring
Motors had the bargaining power to negotiate the Ford warranty. It is not clear that
Spring Motors could have negotiated the warranty running from Clark concerning the
transmissions because the warranty ran to Ford, not Spring Motors. Yet Spring Motors
specified within the contract that Ford should equip the trucks with Clark transmissions
because of "'excellent service and parts availability on past models' and because of Clark's
advertisements and brochures;" presumably, Spring Motors was aware of the Clark
warranty."' Nevertheless, it is not the buyer's awareness, but rather the buyer's ability
to bargain to which the court should look. Because Spring Motors had sufficient bar-
gaining power and was not powerless to protect itself, the reasons for applying strict
liability were not compelling.
In addition to having sufficient bargaining power, Spring Motors was at least as well
situated as the defendants to bear the risk of loss. First, the price paid by Spring Motors
reflected the fact that Ford was liable for repair or replacement only; by imposing the
risk of loss on Ford, Spring Motors would obtain a better bargain than it originally had
made. To impose the risk of loss on Ford would lead to price increases for all of its
customers, including ordinary consumers, while Spring Motors just as easily could pass
on the cost to its own customers. 272
Second, as a commercial consumer, Spring Motors may be better situated than Ford
to insure against the risk of economic loss. 273 In the case of personal injury, while the
manufacturer has a definable, insurable interest, its risk of economic loss is less insurable
because there is no typical, predictable economic loss; the same defective product may
cause varying amounts of loss depending upon the nature of the purchaser."' As one
commentator has noted, almost by definition, a victim only can suffer consequential
economic loss in the course of business, thus the loss can be treated as a cost of the
victim's rather than the manufacturer's enterprise and can be distributed among the
customers who benefit from that enterprise. 2" Therefore, the commercial purchaser can
estimate the effect of a defectively-functioning product on his or her business and insure
accordingly. 276 For that reason, a commercial consumer's risk-bearing ability is as great,
if not greater, than the manufacturer's and thus does not require a strict liability remedy.
The U.C.C.'s comprehensive scheme is well-suited for commercial transactions.
Allowing Spring Motors to recover in strict liability would displace the U.C.C. provisions
of notice and limitations or exclusion of liability. While these provisions frustrate an
ordinary consumer's ability to recover in warranty, they are part of a commercial con-
270 See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text for the facts concerning the Ford and Clark
warranties.
271 Spring Motors, 98 N.J. at 562,489 A.2d at 663.
272 Id. at 576,489 A.2d at 671.
2" 3 Id.
2" See Note, Economic Loss, supra note 51, at 952-58.
gm Id. at 956-57.
272 Id. at 957. Who is the better risk-bearer for direct economic loss presents a closer question.
Presumably, the cost of replacement or repair is predictable and thus more easily insurable by the
manufacturer. Id. A commercial consumer, however, would be able not only to predict the extent
of the risk of loss, but also to pass this risk along within his or her business. On the other hand, an
ordinary consumer is more likely to suffer direct economic loss than consequential loss and such a
consumer would not be able to pass on the risk. Therefore, risk-bearing ability is dependent upon
the type of consumer. See id.
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sumer's bargained-for agreement. Because the policy reasons behind strict liability are
not present in the case of a commercial consumer and because the U.C.C. is a compre-
hensive scheme designed to govern commercial transactions, the U.C.C. restricts a com-
mercial consumer to recovery for economic loss against a remote seller regardless of
privity. It may appear that the court has deferred to the legislature in one breath and
ignored it in the next, but actually the Code is neutral as to vertical privity."'
The Spring Motors court did not look at the type of harm, determine that it was a
consequential loss, and decide that the U.C.C. was the appropriate. remedy. Rather, it
looked to the type of consumer and analyzed whether he lacked the bargaining power
and risk-bearing ability that call for a strict liability remedy. Finding that he did not, the
court appropriately determined that it should restrict the consumer to a U.C.C. remedy.
This analysis is the pure type-of-consumer approach advocated by Justice Peters in his
concurring and dissenting opinion in Seely.
Justice Handler, in his concurring opinion in Spring Motors, makes it clear that the
court's reasoning is parallel to Justice Peters' reasoning. 278 Justice Handler emphasized,
however, that the selection of a remedy does not turn on a label. He stated that it would
be incorrect to consider U.C.C. remedies to be exclusively applicable to a consumer's
claim simply because the transaction can be viewed as "commercial," or having occurred
in the course of business. The ultimate purchaser of a vehicle, Justice Handler continued,
could be a travelling salesperson, a small-scale trucker, a carpenter, plumber, or landscape
gardener, and it would not automatically follow that these consumers would be limited
to a U.C.C. remedy if the vehicle proved to be defective. 279
Justice Handler's warning, however, is needless, for labelling a consumer a "com-
mercial consumer" under the type-of-consumer test requires the court to look at the
consumer's bargaining power and risk-bearing ability. As Justice Handler noted, the
reasons for limiting commercial consumers to a U.C.C. remedy suggest that the U.C.C.
may be inapplicable to cases involving purchasers who are different from those involved
in Spring Motors 28u Logically, if equal bargaining power and an ability to allocate risks
are not present in a given case, strict liability should be available. 28 '
B. The Unification of the Minority Jurisdictions Following Santor
The Spring Motors delineation of the availability of a strict liability remedy unifies
the analytical approach of Santor and its progeny. Although Santor did not consider
whether a distinction should be made on the basis of the type of consumer, it is clear
that it rejected a type-of-harm approach. 282 It is also apparent from the Santor court's
reasoning that the decision is completley reconcilable with the type-of-consumer test.
Specifically, the Santor court stated that the great mass of the purchasing public has
neither adequate knowledge nor sufficient opportunity to determine whether an article
is defective. 283 In addition, the court reasoned that the purpose of strict liability is to
"'See supra note 233 for a discussion of privity.
270 Spring Motors, 98 N.J. at 593, 489 A.2d at 679.
279 Id. at 592, 489 A.2d at 679.
280 1d. at 593, 489 A.2d at 679.
221 Id. at 596, 489 A.2d at 681.
282 Santor, 44 N.J. at 66, 207 A.2d at 312.
202 Id. at 64, 207 A.2d at 311.
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insure that the cost of injuries resulting from defective products is borne by the makers
of the products, who put them in the channels of trade, rather than by the injured
persons who ordinarily are powerless to protect themselves."'" The Santor court thus sets
out the same policy reasons for applying strict liability as those presented in Spring
Motors. In light of these policy reasons, Santor was obviously an ordinary consumer
because he purchased a rug for his home, lacked bargaining power, and was unable to
spread the cost of his loss. The decision is, therefore, consistent with the type of consumer
test.
The minority of jurisdictions following Santor, with the possible exception of Ohio,
employ the same policy reasons articulated in Santor and Spring Motors for allowing
economic loss recovery in strict liability. These decisions, therefore, embrace the type-
of-consumer test. In the Michigan decision, Cove v. Harley Davidson Motor Co.,285 as in
Santor, the court asked whether strict liability should be limited to personal injury cases
and did not directly consider whether a distinction should be made on the type of
plaintiff. The court relied on the Senior reasoning that the manufacturer is the "father
of the transaction," however, and ruled that it could not find any sound reason why the
transaction should not be actionable when inadequate manufacture had put a worthless
article in the hands of an innocent purchaser who had paid the required purchase
price. 284
There is an important difference between the Senior and Cove fact situations, how-
ever. While Senior involved an action by an ordinary consumer who suffered direct
economic loss, 2" Cova involved an action by a small commercial consumer, a husband
and wife team operating a golf course, who suffered both direct economic loss and
consequential economic loss. 2" Although the Cove court declined to decide the issue of
consequential damages, it suggested that the recovery for such loss might depend upon
the type of plaintiff involved. Specifically, the court stated, if damages for loss of profits
are awarded, it will be soon enough to consider whether there should be limitations on
the kinds of plaintiffs who will be permitted to recover consequential damages. 2" This
hint places Cova within Justice Peters' reasoning in his concurring and dissenting opinion
in Seely that it is not the nature of the damage that warrants attention, but rather the
roles played by the parties and the nature of their transaction.
While the Cova court did not indicate how a type-of-consumer test would work,
under the reasoning of Spring Motors, the court would look to the Covas' bargaining
power and risk-bearing ability. After weighing these factors, the court could find the
Covas to be ordinary consumers and allow recovery in strict liability. Although the
defective product in Cove was to be used in the course of the plaintiff's business, the
plaintiff in fact had no more bargaining power than an individual buying at the retail
level. Thus, Cova is consistent with the Spring Motors type-of-consumer test.
284
	 at 65, 207 A.2d at 312.
295
	 Mich. App. 602, 182 N.W.2d 800 (1970). See supra notes 100-13 and accompanying text
for the facts and reasoning of Cove.
2s5 Cove, 26 Mich. App. at 608, 182 N.W.2d at 804 (quoting Santor, 44 N.J. at 60, 207 A.2d at
309).
287 See supra notes 54-72 and accompanying text for the facts and reasoning of Senior,
288 See supra notes 100-1$ and accompanying text for the facts and reasoning of Cove.
289 Cove, 26 Mich. App. at 620, 182 N.W.2d at 811.
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Similarly, the municipality in the Wisconsin decision, LaCrosse v. Schubert, Schroeder
& Assoc., 29° as in Cova, is not easily definable as an ordinary consumer. As in Cova, the
LaCrosse court did not specifically permit the recovery based on the type of consumer,
but relied instead on the Santor reasoning that there was no sound reason to distinguish
between personal injury and economic loss in determining recovery in strict liability. 2"
While the court does not mention any distinction between the type of plaintiffs, by
employing the Santor reasoning, the LaCrosse court looked to the policy reasons for
allowing strict liability. To determine the relevance of these policy reasons to a particular
case, the LaCrosse court had to consider the type of consumer, not the type of harm.
Arguably, the LaCrosse court went too far in allowing the city to recover. First, a city
seeking to replace a roof certainly would have more bargaining power than a homeowner
seeking to do the same. Second, a city would be better able to allocate the risk of loss
and pass it along to its taxpayers. The city in LaCrosse, however, apparently did not have
sufficient bargaining power to reach one of the defendants. In addition to suing the
general contractor, LaCrosse sued the architects, the roofing installation company, and
the manufacturer of the aluminum roof.292 Thus, LaCrosse could present the factual
problems of which Justice Handler warned in his concurring opinion in Spring Motors. 295
Specifically, LaCrosse may not have had the opportunity to negotiate with these remote
defendants who may have had disclaimers or limitations of damages within the warranties
they provided to each other and of which the plaintiff would not have been aware.
Furthermore, unlike Spring Motors, there is no indication in LaCrosse that the city specified
the type of roof to be supplied. In Spring Motors, the court gave great weight in evaluating
the parties' bargaining power to Spring Motors' specification to Ford requiring Clark
transmissions. 294 Therefore, LaCrosse would require more facts than the court supplied
to determine whether the city of LaCrosse could be considered an ordinary consumer.
Of the minority of jurisdictions following Santor, Ohio may be the only jurisdiction
not reconcilable with the type-of-consumer test. in Iacono v. Anderson Concrete Corp., 295
the plaintiff, who recovered for direct economic loss, was a homeowner replacing a
driveway.296 Certainly, Iacono was an ordinary consumer with little bargaining power
and no risk-bearing ability; thus his recovery in strict liability was proper under a type-
of-consumer test. In Mead Corp. v. Allendale Mutual Ins. Co., 297 however, the court relied
on the fact that Iacono allowed recovery for direct economic loss, 298 ignored the fact that
Iacono was an ordinary consumer, and allowed a large corporation to recover its eco-
nomic loss in strict liability. Neither of the policy reasons for applying strict liability were
present. First, Mead's sufficient bargaining power was apparent from the facts. Knowing
29° 72 Wis. 2d 38, 240 N.W.2d 124 (1976). See supra notes 114-19 and accompanying text for
the facts and reasoning of LaCrosse.
291 LaCrosse, 72 Wis. 2d at 45, 240 N.W.2d at 127 (citing Santor, 44 N.J. at 60, 207 A.2d at 309).
292 1d. at 40, 240 N.W.2d at 125.
292
	
Spring Motors, 98 N.J. at 594, 49 A.2d at 680 (Handler, J., concurring). See supra notes
239-43 and accompanying text for a discussion of Justice Handler's factual concerns.
29* Spring Motors, 98 N.J. at 576, 489 A.2d at 671.
295 42 Ohio St. 2d at 88, 326 N.E.2d at 268.
299
	
at 88, 326 N.E.2d at 267. See supra notes 120-25 and accompanying text for the facts
and reasoning of Iacono.
297
	 F. Supp. 355 (D.N.J. 1979).
29E
	
at 366 (citing Iacono, 42 Ohio St. 2d at 93, 326 N.E.2d at 271). See supra notes 125-36
and accompanying text for the facts and reasoning of Mead.
March 1987]	 CASENOTES	 413
that one of the Swedish defendants would manufacture the turbine it was purchasing
and that another would manufacture many of the component parts, Mead sent its
technicians to Sweden for a meeting with officials of both defendant companies. 299
Second, Mead's ability to bear the risk of loss likewise was apparent; Mead was a large
corporation and thus could pass on its costs to its consumers. In addition, Mead could
and did insure. Indeed, Mead sued one of the insurance companies for the $1,260,000
loss it claimed it had forthcoming under the policy. ," Therefore, Mead was not an
ordinary consumer, lacking in bargaining power or an ability to bear risks, but rather, a
commercial consumer, well-equipped to bargain for the commercial transaction it had
undertaken. Accordingly, Mead should have been denied recovery for its economic loss
in strict liability and, like the commercial consumer in Spring Motors, should have been
limited to a U.C.C. recovery.
Applying the Spring Motors type-of-consumer test to the minority case law following
Santo?' clearly shows that the type-of-consumer test is not entirely dependent upon the
labels of "ordinary" versus "commercial" consumer; the test requires a balancing of
policy as well. Given this balancing of policy, the courts will be able to resolve the two
fact situations as yet unsettled under the type-of-consumer test. The first of the situations,
presented by Cova, involves a small commercial consumer seeking to recover economic
loss in strict liability. In light of a small commercial consumer's bargaining power and
risk-bearing ability, it should be classified as an ordinary consumer for several reasons.
First, if a small commercial consumer refuses to accept a manufacturer's terms, which
may include disclaimers and limitations on liability, the manufacturer, after weighing
the profits against the anticipated risks, probably will refuse to sell to the consumer a
product which the consumer may require for his or her business."' Second, small
commercial consumers may not have the luxury of turning to other manufacturers if
the disclaimer or limitation on liability is an industry-wide phenomenon." Third, if
small commercial consumers do not accept the manufacturer's terms, then their losses
resulting from the defective product could render them insolvent." This quandary is
indicative of the small commercial consumer's lack of bargaining power.
Nor is a small commercial consumer able to allocate its risks. Passing its cost on to
the customer can lead to loss of business because the customer can obtain the product
or service elsewhere for a lower price. If the manufacturer's terms create a higher-priced
business industry-wide, the manufacturer's business, with a wider distribution will better
pass along the price."4
 Likewise, a small commercial consumer is not in a good position
to insure against risks, because, as one commentator reasons, even if insurance is ob-
tainable, the small commercial consumer can not afford the expense of the premiums. 505
In conclusion, a small commercial consumer is in no better situation to bargain or bear
the risk than an ordinary consumer. Under the type-of-consumer test, therefore, small
commercial consumers should be allowed to recover damages in strict liability.
The second situation as yet unsettled under the type-of-consumer test involves an
ordinary consumer seeking to recover consequential economic loss. While Cova presented
299 Mead, 465 F. Supp. at 357.
X00 Id. at 359.
"I Comment, The Vexing Problem, supra note 2, at 180.
302 Id.
"I Id.
3" Spring Motors, 98 N.J. at 576, 489 A.2d at 671.
"Comment, The Vexing Problem, supra note 2, at 180.
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the closest situation to an ordinary consumer seeking consequential, as opposed to direct,
economic loss, the issue has not been squarely presented in the Santor minority jurisdic-
tions — New Jersey, Michigan, Wisconsin, or Ohio. An ordinary consumer, by definition,
is not likely to suffer consequential damages." 6 Justice Peters in his concurring and
dissenting opinion in Seely, however, classified Seely as an ordinary consumer, although
engaged in the business of heavy-duty hauling, and would have allowed him to recover
for the indirect economic loss, the lost profits which he suffered as a result of the truck's
defectiveness. 307 Therefore, under the type-of-consumer approach, courts would label
small commercial consumers, like Seely or Cova, as ordinary consumers provided they
lacked the bargaining power and risk-bearing ability found in such consumers. As
ordinary consumers, they would be allowed to recover for all of their damages, including
consequential economic loss, in strict liability.
In summary, Spring Motors advocates a type-of-consumer test to be employed in
determining whether a consumer can recover for economic loss in strict liability. This
test requires that courts consider the type-of-consumer seeking to recover. If the con-
sumers lack bargaining power and risk-bearing ability, they should be labelled ordinary
consumers. As ordinary consumers, they should be allowed to recover all of their dam-
ages in strict liability. Conversely, if their bargaining power and risk-bearing ability are
sufficiently comparable to the manufacturer's, they should be labelled commercial con-
sumers. As commercial consumers, they should be restricted to recovery under the
Uniform Commercial Code.
CONCLUSION
In holding that a commercial consumer cannot recover economic loss in strict liability
and implying that an ordinary consumer can, Spring Motors will have significant impact
on future economic loss cases. Prior to Spring Motors, the courts following the lead of
Santor allowed economic loss recovery in strict liability based upon the policy of placing
the cost of a defective product on the manufacturer who placed the product on the
market, not on the consumers who were powerless to protect themselves. Spring Motors
clarified that this approach is in essence a type-of-consumer test, requiring the courts to
define the types of consumers based on their ability to bargain and bear risks.
Spring Motors has not only clarified the test, but also has unified the minority of
jurisdictions that allow a consumer to recover economic loss in strict liability. In the
future, these jurisdictions will have a clear indication of what type of consumer will be
allowed such recovery. Furthermore, Spring Motors brings the minority into conformity
with the majority in denying economic loss to commercial consumers, although by a
different approach. In so doing, Spring Motors leaves only recovery for economic loss by
ordinary consumers as the issue differentiating the majority approach from the minority.
SARAH BORSTEL PORTER
106 Note, Economic Loss, supra note 51, at 952-57.
"'See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text for Justice Peters' reasoning in Seely.
